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Symposium: Capabilities of Non-human Species

Animals who live in cities must coexist with us. They are, as a result, entitled to the conditions of their flourishing. This article argues that, as the boundaries of cities and urban areas expand, the boundaries of our conception of captivity should expand too. Urbanization can undermine animals’ freedoms, hence their ability to live good lives. I draw the implications of an account of “pervasive captivity” against the background of the Capabilities Approach. I construe captivity, including that of urban animals, as affecting a range of animal capabilities, understood as freedoms, and I address some tensions within Nussbaum’s treatment of human-animal conflicts. Using the Capabilities Approach as a guide, I will attempt to motivate a convergence between habitat preservation in urbanized environments, urban design guided by justice, and the individual freedoms of animals.

Discussed on an episode of The Animal Turn podcast.

In On What Matters, Parfit defends a moral objectivism on which he hopes philosophers will eventually converge. At the heart of this hope are irreducible normative truths, such as the claim that suffering is intrinsically bad. Parfit wonders if Nietzsche threatens his edifice and dedicates an entire chapter to him, capping the discussion of moral disagreement and convergence. He concludes that Nietzsche either isn't truly in disagreement or isn't reasoning under satisfactory conditions. Here, I challenge Parfit's prediction of convergence and show that Nietzsche poses an even more serious threat than Parfit claims. I argue that the idea that suffering can be good is intelligible, coherent, and more complex than Parfit's reading reveals.

Most people believe that suffering is intrinsically bad. In conjunction with facts about our world and plausible moral principles, this yields a pro tanto obligation to reduce suffering. This is the intuitive starting point for the moral argument in favor of interventions to prevent wild animal suffering (WAS). If we accept the moral principle that we ought, pro tanto, to reduce the suffering of all sentient creatures, and we recognize the prevalence of suffering in the wild, then we seem committed to the existence of such a pro tanto obligation. Of course, competing values such as the aesthetic, scientific or moral values of species, biodiversity, naturalness or wildness, might be relevant to the all-things-considered case for or against intervention. Still, many argue that, even if we were to give some weight to such values, no plausible theory could resist the conclusion that WAS is overridingly important. This article is concerned with large-scale interventions to prevent WAS and their tractability and the deep epistemic problem they raise. We concede that suffering gives us a reason to prevent it where it occurs, but we argue that the nature of ecosystems leaves us with no reason to predict that interventions would reduce, rather than exacerbate, suffering. We consider two interventions, based on gene editing technology, proposed as holding promise to prevent WAS; raise epistemic concerns about them; discuss their potential moral costs; and conclude by proposing a way forward: to justify interventions to prevent WAS, we need to develop models that predict the effects of interventions on biodiversity, ecosystem functioning, and animals’ well-being.

In the third edition of ‘Practical Ethics’ (2011), Peter Singer reexamines the so-called “replaceability argument,” according to which merely sentient beings, as opposed to persons (self-conscious and with a robust sense of time), are replaceable—it is in principle permissible to kill them provided that they live pleasant lives that they would not have had otherwise and that they be replaced by equally happy beings. On this view, existence is a benefit and death is not a harm. Singer’s challenge is to avoid (i) the replaceability of persons while preserving the replaceability of merely sentient beings, (ii) the implication that parents are morally required to procreate if they can have happy children, and (iii) to do avoid these implications without having the proposed solution (the “debit view” of preferences) imply negative utilitarianism, or the conclusion that a nonsentient universe is better than any sentient universe. I review Singer’s changing views since 1975 and I argue that his attempt to avoid the replaceability of persons fails: either both non-persons and persons are replaceable or neither are. Singer can only avoid this conclusion by appealing to controversial metaethical claims (attitude-independent moral objectivism) and/or giving up on essential features of utilitarianism.

Starting from a distinction between intrinsic and final value, I explore the implications of the supervenience of final value on extrinsic properties regarding moral status. I make a case for ‘extrinsic moral status’ based on ‘extrinsic final value’. I show that the assumption of ‘moral individualism’, that moral status supervenes merely on intrinsic properties, is misguided, and results from a conflation of intrinsic with final value. I argue that at least one extrinsic property, namely vulnerability, can be the basis of both final value and moral status, and that dependence on such extrinsic properties is compatible with the requirement of agent-neutrality.

This article outlines a “descriptive animal ethics” based on the study of people’s intuitions about particular cases, in order to determine which moral theories best comport with those intuitions. I suggest that the latter need not be unreliable since they may be endorsed as considered judgments, and that even if they were, knowing them would still provide relevant information for a complete moral theory concerned with what moral agents can do. I describe a survey in descriptive ethics, discuss the results, and introduce prospective experiments. I then set forth hypotheses and propose a dual model of moral status attribution in terms of both intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I rely on recent empirical research in psychology and experimental philosophy, which I confront with the above results, to support my hypotheses. The model predicts that attributions vary depending on the capacities of entities, their context (including relationships), and the context of the attributor. These facts of descriptive ethics, I conclude, are directly relevant to normative ethics insofar as our cognitive apparatus constrains our ability to act morally. Moreover, they suggest ways to improve moral perception, education, and motivation.

Commentary on Kyle Johannsen, Wild Animal Ethics: The Moral and Political Problem of Wild Animal Suffering. Routledge, 2021.

I unpack what we should understand by wild animal well-being, and how different interpretations of what matters about it shape the sorts of interventions we endorse. I will not offer a theory of wild animal well-being or even take a stance on the best approach to theories of well-being as they pertain to wild animals. My aim is to bring into view a concern that WAE has largely overlooked: agency and freedom. To Johannsen’s credit, the issue of liberties does feature in his Wild Animal Ethics (2020) (36–39, 41, 47). The interventions that he favors are those that, for a given amount of harm prevention, involve fewer liberty infringements. Liberties can act, to an extent, as constraints on permissible interventions. For all that, Johannsen’s primary focus remains welfare in a sense that does not appear to give much consideration to agency. Fortunately, his approach is open-ended enough to accommodate some of my concerns. My hope is that he sees them as possible ways of specifying the duties of beneficence, if not justice, that he rightly argues we have to wild animals.

Commentary on Mikhalevich, Irina and Powell, Russell (2020) Minds without spines: Evolutionarily inclusive animal ethics. Animal Sentience 29(1) DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1527.

Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and requires that we consider their welfare.

Commentary on Shawn Thompson, Supporting Ape Rights: Finding the Right Fit Between Science and the Law

Shawn Thompson’s target article provides a fascinating insight into judicial activism for the recognition of the legal personhood of great apes, focusing his discussion on Steven Wise’s Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) and reports he wrote over 20152017 for a court case in Buenos Aires, Argentina, seeking release from a zoo for the orangutan Sandra. Thompson describes both the philosophical underpinning of a legal battle and the concrete obstacles faced by plaintiffs. My response to Wise’s and Thompson’s strategy is two-fold: 1) personhood is neither strictly determined by cognitive facts nor fruitfully construed in Kantian terms, and 2) personhood is not what matters when it comes to animal protection. To conclude, 3) I hint at an alternative, or complementary, avenue for change.

Delon, N. (2019). Commentary: Setting the Bar Higher. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 28(1), 40–45. DOI:10.1017/S0963180118000361

Commentary on Neuhaus, C. P., & Parent, B. (2019). Gene Doping—in Animals? Ethical Issues at the Intersection of Animal Use, Gene Editing, and Sports Ethics. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 28(1), 26–39. DOI:10.1017/S096318011800035X

Carolyn Neuhaus and Brendan Parent examine three main techniques aimed at enhancing animals’ skills for sport—selective breeding, chemical enhancement, and genetic engineering. Their central focus is on “gene doping,” i.e., recent advances in gene editing such as CRISPR, that could be used to create stronger, faster, or more resilient animals. As they note, people have sought for millennia to perfect sport animals; CRISPR seeks to do it over many fewer generations and may even enhance animals’ capacities beyond their typical limits. The paper discusses the general ethical limits of animal use for sport and analyzes current and future ethical issues raised by gene editing in the context of using animals in sports. They argue that sport enthusiasts and animal advocates alike should be concerned about the inevitable use of CRISPR in sports. Though in principle gene editing could be used to improve well-being, they caution that it is unlikely in practice to do so. I concur with Neuhaus and Parent’s conclusion. In this commentary, I adduce further reasons for this conclusion. But I also suggest ways in which animal participation in sport could be enhanced in respectful ways.

Issue: Animals: Ethics, Agency, Culture

Can animals be agents? Do they want to be free? Can they have meaningful lives? If so, should we change the way we treat them? This paper offers an account of animal agency and of two continuums: between human and nonhuman agency, and between wildness and captivity. It describes how human activities impede on animals’ freedom and argues that, in doing so, we deprive many animals of opportunities to exercise their agency in ways that can give meaning to their lives.

Delon, N. (2017). L’animal d’élevage compagnon de travail. L’éthique des fables alimentaires. Revue française d'éthique appliquée, 4(2), 61-75. DOI:10.3917/rfeap.004.0061.

Article in French. Special issue on food ("Se nourrir : un enjeu éthique")

Jocelyne Porcher sets out to “reinvent” our relationship with animals so that we can better “live with” them. This article provides a critical examination of her thesis that farm animals can be seen as proper workers, in a sense that precludes the sort of unjust exploitation that she ascribes to factory farming. Contrary to Porcher, the article considers relationships between humans and domesticated species that do not involve killing or even work for food production purposes. The present critique focuses on the distinction between (industrial) “animal productions” and (traditional) “husbandry” practices; the notion of the animal as a worker and its implications; and finally, the assumptions that lead Porcher to overlook possible alternative relationships.

Comment on Naidoo R, Weaver CL, Diggle RW, Matongo G, Stuart-Hill G, Thouless C. 2016. Complementary benefits of tourism and hunting to communal conservancies in Namibia. Conservation Biology, 30: 628–638. DOI:10.1111/cobi.12643

Naidoo et al. (2016) assessed benefits from hunting and tourism in Namibia from 1998 to 2013 at 77 communal conservancies, which provide community-based wildlife conservation. They found that hunting and tourism each generates roughly the same economic value and that if trophy hunting were banned, some conservancies would be unable to cover their operating costs. As a result, the authors concluded that trophy hunting provides a benefit to conservation. We find problems with both their methods, which rely on opaque assumptions about the value of trophy-hunted meat and their conclusions about trophy hunting’s relationship to conservation in Namibia. Both their methods and conclusions rest on narrow (and in some aspects unclear) assumptions about values. Furthermore, conservation decisions are not and should not be driven by economic benefits alone.

Delon, N. (2015). Études animales : un aperçu transatlantique. Tracés. Revue de Sciences humaines, 15: 187-198. DOI: 10.4000/traces.6274.

Article in French.

I present some inevitably partial remarks on the intrinsic complexities of animal studies, the contrasts I have observed between Anglo-American and French approaches, and the essential link between theory and practice that plays out within it. I will begin by painting an initial picture of the diversity of animal studies as a disciplinary field. I will then suggest that a critical dimension is inherent to it. Finally, I will focus on the differences between the Francophone and Anglophone worlds, particularly in philosophy.

Delon, N. (2014. La mort : un mal non nécessaire, surtout pour les animaux heureux ! Revue semestrielle de droit animalier, 2/2014: 247-276.

Article in French.

This paper examines the harm of death to sentient animals, challenging arguments for "humane" or "happy" animal farming. These arguments typically assume animal deaths are acceptable while human deaths for similar purposes are not—either through speciesism or by claiming animals lack the psychological capacity to be harmed by death. I demonstrate that death constitutes a significant harm for many animals, raising unavoidable moral questions about farming practices regardless of their other merits. Paradoxically, the very arguments for "happy" farming that emphasize animals' valuable lives make their deaths more morally problematic, not less. The paper first addresses the replacement problem, then presents empirical evidence that killing harms animals, and finally analyzes how death can be bad for non-human animals.