Nicolas Delon

I am currently working on three interrelated projects:

  • Animal metaethics: how disagreements within animal ethics are shaped by debates at its periphery (e.g., axiology, metaethics, science and values, concepts), and how they can be solved (or dissolved) accordingly (including the vexed relation between animal and environmental ethics)
  • Matters of life and death: meaning in the lives of animals and its moral implications; the ethics of breeding and killing animals; what it takes to be irreplaceable; the suffering and the freedom of wild animals, and what are our corresponding obligations; relations between ecosystems and animal well-being; relations between captivity, freedom, and well-being
  • Descriptive ethics: how moral theory and practice can be informed, and constrained, by social/moral psychology and experimental philosophy, in particular our attitudes to nature and other entities and the underlying cognitive processes

These three projects draw on published and working papers, most of which appear below and often feed into more than just one project. P
enultimate and/or open access versions of many papers can be found on my Academia, ResearchGate, or PhilPapers profiles. You can also email me for drafts or preprints..

My dissertation, under the supervision of Sandra Laugier, defended a contextual theory of the moral status of animals [full text].


Comment: Beyond the personhood paradigm

ASEBL Journal (2019) [open access]
Comment on Shawn Thompson, “Supporting Ape Rights: Finding the Right Fit Between Science and the Law”

Commentary: Setting the bar higher
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2019) [final draft] [link]
Commentary on Carolyn Neuhaus and Brendan Parent, “Gene Doping – in Animals? Ethical issues at the intersection of animal use, gene editing, and sports ethics”

Social norms and farm animal protection
Palgrave Communications (2018) [open access]
Social change is slow and difficult. Social change for animals is formidably slow and difficult. Advocates and scholars alike have long tried to change attitudes and convince the public that eating animals is wrong. The topic of norms and social change for animals has been neglected, which explains in part the relative failure of the animal protection movement to secure robust support reflected in social and legal norms. Moreover, animal ethics has suffered from a disproportionate focus on individual attitudes and behavior at the expense of social change and empirical psychology. If what we want to change is behavior on a large scale, norms are important tools. This article reviews an account of social norm that provides insights into the possibility and limitations of social change for animals, approaching animal protection as a problem of reverse social engineering. It highlights avenues for future work from this neglected perspective.

Animal agency, captivity and meaning
Harvard Review of Philosophy (2018) [link]
Can animals be agents? Do they want to be free? Can they have meaningful lives? If so, should be change the way we treat them? This paper offers an account of animal agency and of two continuums: between human and nonhuman agency, and between wildness and captivity. It describes how human activities impede on animals’ freedom and argues that, in doing so, we deprive many animals of opportunities to exercise their agency in ways that can give meaning to their lives.

Wild animal suffering is intractable (coauthored with Duncan Purves)
Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics (2018) [link]
Most people believe that suffering is intrinsically bad. In conjunction with facts about our world and plausible moral principles, this yields a pro tanto obligation to reduce suffering. This is the intuitive starting point for the moral argument in favor of interventions to prevent wild animal suffering (WAS). This article is concerned with large-scale interventions to prevent WAS and their tractability and the deep epistemic problem they raise. We concede that suffering gives us a reason to prevent it where it occurs, but we argue that the nature of ecosystems leaves us with no reason to predict that interventions would reduce, rather than exacerbate, suffering. We consider two interventions, based on gene editing technology, proposed as holding promise to prevent WAS; raise epistemic concerns about them; discuss their potential moral costs; and conclude by proposing a way forward: to justify interventions to prevent WAS, we need to develop models that predict the effects of interventions on biodiversity, ecosystem functioning, and animals' well-being.

Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals (coauthored with Duncan Purves)
Philosophical Studies (2018) [link] [abstract
This paper argues that contemporary philosophical literature on meaning in life has important implications for the debate about our obligations to non-human animals. If animal lives can be meaningful, then practices including factory farming and animal research might be morally worse than ethicists have thought. We argue for two theses about meaning in life: (1) that the best account of meaning in life must take intentional action to be necessary for meaning—an individual's life has meaning if and only if the individual acts intentionally in ways that contribute to finally valuable states of affairs; and (2) that this first thesis does not entail that only human lives are meaningful. Because non-human animals can be intentional agents of a certain sort, our account yields the verdict that many animals' lives can be meaningful. We conclude by considering the moral implications of this pair of theses for common practices involving animals.

L'animal d'élevage compagnon de travail: l'éthique des fables alimentaires
Revue française d'éthique appliquée (2017) [link]
Jocelyne Porcher sets out to "reinvent" our relationship to animals in order to better "live with" them. This article provides a critical examination of her thesis that farm animals can be seen as proper workers, in a sense that precludes the sort of unjust exploitation that she ascribes to factory farming. Contrary to Porcher, the article considers relationships between humans and domesticated species which do not entail killing or even work for food production purposes. The present critique focuses on the distinction between the (industrial) "animal productions" and the (traditional) "husbandry" practices; the notion of animal worker and its implications; finally, the assumptions leading Porcher to overlook possible alternative relationships.

The values behind calculating the value of trophy hunting (coauthored with Jennifer Jacquet)
Conservation Biology (2016) [link]
Naidoo et al. (2016) assessed benefits from hunting and tourism in Namibia from 1998 to 2013 at 77 communal conservancies, which provide community-based wildlife conservation. They found that hunting and tourism each generates roughly the same economic value and that if trophy hunting were banned, some conservancies would be unable to cover their operating costs. As a result, the authors concluded that trophy hunting provides a benefit to conservation. We find problems with both their methods, which rely on opaque assumptions about the value of trophy-hunted meat and their conclusions about trophy hunting's relationship to conservation in Namibia. Both their methods and conclusions rest on narrow (and in some aspects unclear) assumptions about values. Furthermore, conservation decisions are not and should not be driven by economic benefits alone.

Un Singer peut-il en remplacer un autre ?
Klêsis, issue: Peter Singer (2016) [link]
In the third edition of 'Practical Ethics' (2011), Peter Singer reexamines the so-called "replaceability argument," according to which merely sentient beings, as opposed to persons (self-conscious and with a robust sense of time), are replaceable—it is in principle permissible to kill them provided that they live pleasant lives that they would not have had otherwise and that they be replaced by equally happy beings. On this view, existence is a benefit and death is not a harm. Singer's challenge is to avoid (i) the replaceability of persons while preserving the replaceability of merely sentient beings, (ii) the implication that parents are morally required to procreate if they can have happy children, and (iii) to do avoid these implications without having the proposed solution (the "debit view" of preferences) imply negative utilitarianism, or the conclusion that a nonsentient universe is better than any sentient universe. I review Singer's changing views since 1975 and I argue that his attempt to avoid the replaceability of persons fails: either both non-persons and persons are replaceable or neither are. Singer can only avoid this conclusion by appealing to controversial metaethical claims and/or giving up on essential features of utilitarianism.

Etudes animales : une perspective transatlantique
Tracés : Revue de Sciences Humaines (2015) [link]
This review essay offers a personal account of the intrinsic complexity of animal studies, of the contrast between French and English-speaking approaches, and of the essential tie between theory and practice. I outline the diversity of the field, suggest that animals studies have an inherently critical component, and focus on the example of philosophy and significant differences between the US and France.

Une théorie morale peut-elle être cognitivement trop exigeante ?
Implications Philosophiques, issue: Empirical ethics (2015) [link]
Starting from the typical case of utilitarianism, I distinguish three ways a moral theory may be deemed (over-)demanding: practical, epistemic, and cognitive. I focus on the latter, whose specific nature has been overlooked. Taking animal ethics as a case study, I argue that knowledge of human cognition is critical to spelling out moral theories (including their implications) that are accessible and acceptable to most ordinary agents. In a nutshell: knowing more about our cognitive apparatus with in order to work better with it. This meta-theoretical suggestion, however, differs from a classical objection drawn from the intuition that a given theory demands too much.

La mort : un mal non nécessaire, surtout pour les animaux heureux !
Revue semestrielle de droit animalier, issue: Factory farming (2014) [link]
I argue that death is a significant harm to many animals, hence, that raising animals for food raises serious moral questions. Justifications of the practice of raising and killing "happy" animals presuppose the recognition that farm animals have intrinsic or final value, which turns out to make their death even more morally problematic. In other words, humane farming addresses the issue of harmful death by emphasizing the value of the happy life bestowed on such individuals, thereby making their killing all the more in need of justification. I briefly present the 'replaceability argument' (implying that killing and replacing happy animals is permissible). I then adduce empirical considerations to support an argument that killing happy animals is
pro tanto wrong (depending on the lives they could have had). Finally, I review different accounts of the badness of death, how they apply to animals, and suggest that the more plausible account supports an argument for the pro tanto impermissibility of killing happy animals.

Moral status, final value, and extrinsic properties
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2014) [link]
Starting from a distinction between intrinsic and final value, I explore the implications of the supervenience of final value on extrinsic properties regarding moral status. I make a case for 'extrinsic moral status' based on 'extrinsic final value'. I show that the assumption of 'moral individualism', that moral status supervenes merely on intrinsic properties, is misguided, and results from a conflation of intrinsic with final value. I argue that at least one extrinsic property, namely vulnerability, can be the basis of both final value and moral status, and that dependence on such extrinsic properties is compatible with the requirement of agent-neutrality.

Pour une éthique animale descriptive [Plea for descriptive animal ethics]
Klêsis, issue: Experimental philosophy (2013) [link]
Czech translation by
Olga Smolová, Journal of Medical Law and Bioethics 6(1) (2016) [link]
This article outlines a 'descriptive animal ethics' based on the study of people's intuitions about particular cases, in order to determine which moral theories best comport with those intuitions. I suggest that the latter need not be unreliable since they may be endorsed as considered judgments, and that even if they were, knowing them would still provide relevant information for a complete moral theory concerned with what moral agents can do. I describe a survey in descriptive ethics, discuss the results, and introduce prospective experiments. I then set forth hypotheses and propose a dual model of moral status attribution in terms of both intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I rely on recent empirical research in psychology and experimental philosophy, which I confront with the above results The model predicts that attributions vary depending on the capacities of entities, their context and the context of the attributor. Descriptive ethics, I claim, is directly to normative ethics insofar as our cognitive apparatus constrains our ability to act morally. Moreover, they suggest ways to improve moral perception, education, and motivation.


The meaning of animal labour (forthcoming) [penultimate draft]
Animal Labour, C. Blattner, K. Coulter, W. Kymlicka, eds. Oxford University Press
Proponents of humane or traditional husbandry, in contrast to factory farming, often argue that maintaining meaningful relationships with animals entails working with them. Accordingly, they argue that animal liberation is misguided, since it appears to entail erasing our relationships to animals and depriving both us and them of valuable opportunities to live together. This chapter offers a critical examination of defense of animal husbandry based on the value of labour, in particular the view that farm animals could be seen as workers, and what it entails. It then considers ways in which our relationships to domesticated species could be made meaningful, including through work, without entailing the premature killing of animals raised for food. Meaningful animal lives depend on a proper analysis of the meaning, and value, of labour, which this chapter argues is missing from labour-based defenses of humane husbandry.

Les cartographies de l'éthique animale
S'engager pour les animaux, F. Carrié & C. Traïni. eds. (forthcoming) [final draft]
An accessible overview (in French) of contemporary trends and issues in animal ethics.

The Replaceability Argument in the ethics of animal husbandry
Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics, D. Kaplan & P. B. Thompson. eds. 2nd ed. (2016) [link]
Most people agree that inflicting unnecessary suffering upon animals is wrong. Many fewer people, including among ethicists, agree that painlessly killing animals is necessarily wrong. This entry explores the ethical and metaphysical issues underlying the so-called Replaceability Argument according to which ew may (or should) create (and later kill) animals the would otherwise not exist provided they have pleasant lives are are replaced by other happy animals after their death. These issues lie at the intersection of animal ethics, the ethics of killing, procreation ethics, population ethics, and food ethics.

L'éthique animale en contexte
Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage: L'animal, M. Jouan & J.-Y. Goffi eds., Vrin (2016) [publisher]
In this paper I present an experimental study testing Palmer's "laissez-faire intuition" to the effect that our positive duties to animals vary across contexts (e.g. domesticated vs. wild). I discuss some methodological concerns and competing interpretations of the results. Although the causal version of Palmer's empirical hypothesis appears to be partly supported by these results, I emphasize the need for further studies to identify the precise criteria appealed to when justifying context-dependent differences in positive duties.

La sensibilité en éthique animale, entre faits et valeurs
Sensibilités animales - Perspectives juridiques, R. Bismuth & F. Marchadier eds., CNRS (2015) [publisher]
This chapter presents the main views on the role of sentience in animal ethics. Insofar as human sentience grounds moral and legal protections of human interests, why would the sentience of other animals ground analogous protections of their interests? "Sensibilité" is understood as the ability to suffer (sentience) and as sensitivity to others' suffering. It is both a matter of (physiological, cognitive) facts and a matter of values (what matters). I consider sentience/sensitivity ("sensibilité") in animal ethics from two standpoints: as a criterion of moral consideration and in relation to the notion of welfare.

Against moral intrinsicalism
Animal Ethics and Philosophy: Questioning the Orthodoxy, E. Aaltola & J. Hadley eds., Rowman & Littlefield (2015) [publisher]
This paper challenges a widespread, if tacit, assumption of animal ethics, namely, that the only properties of entities that matter to their moral status are intrinsic, cross‐specific properties—typically psychological capacities. According to moral individualism, the moral status of an individual, and how to treat him or her, should only be a function of his or her individual properties. I focus on the fundamental assumption of moral individualism, which I call intrinsicalism. On the challenged view, pigs, puppies and babies, insofar as they are intrinsically similar in morally relevant respects are equally deserving of having their interests satisfied. Moreover, relationships—merely agent-relative—are assumed to be irrelevant to moral status. I argue that, while some intrinsic properties are indeed fundamentally relevant, the principled exclusion of extrinsic properties (in virtue of extrinsicness) is unwarranted. From uncontroversial assumptions about supervenience, final value, and moral status, I argue for the relevance of extrinsic properties to moral status based on vulnerability and "reasonable partiality", as illustrated by pet-keeping.

Handicap et animaux
Tous vulnérables ? Le care, les animaux et l'environnement, S. Laugier ed., Payot-Rivages (2012) [publisher]
This chapter addresses issues in comparing nonhuman animals and severely disabled human beings in terms of their morally relevant characteristics. Through a discussion of the works of Jeff McMahan, Eva Feder Kittay and Martha Nussbaum, the paper offers a defense of the importance and possibility of extending care and compassion to nonhumans without collapsing relevant species differences.

Work in Progress (titles changed for blind review) (email for drafts)

On urban animals and freedom (Revise & Resubmit)
This paper argues from an analysis of the concept of captivity that, as the boundaries of cities expand, the boundaries of our conception of captivity should expand to include borderline animals such as urban animals.

Realism and suffering (under review)
Is suffering really bad? In a robustly realistic (i.e. attitude-independent) sense? This papers has two aims: to offer a cogent interpretation of Nietzsche's claims about the value of suffering against Derek Parfit's attempt to set them aside as misguided; to offer a genealogical debunking reading of realism about suffering, including Parfit's, in light of philosophical and empirical discussions of our attitudes to suffering.

Personhood, species, and community (in progress)
I propose an account of moral status allowing for variations based on community-membership. Sketching the notion of person-communities, I argue that community-membership can constitute a set of morally relevant grounds for elevated moral status while satisfying two fundamental desiderata of theories of moral status: Moral Relevance and Supervenience. However, I argue against one common presupposition of many prominent theories of moral status – Intrinsicalism.

Valuing humane lives (in progress)
Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition (2012), Gary Varner offers a detailed reading and defense of two-level utilitarianism, as articulated by Hare in Moral Thinking (1981). This article takes up the promise of two-level utilitarianism to reveal an internal weakness. The central concern of this paper is whether the lives of humanely raised and killed animals are properly valued in the two-level utilitarian theory by its own lights. .

Meaningful lives, complicity, and collective harms (in progress)
Large-scale practices like factory farming involve considerable harm caused by the aggregated effects of individual acts supported by structural features of such practices. But individual consumers often cannot make a difference—a classic example of collective harm problem. I sidestep discussions of causal impotence and offer an alternative approach to the puzzle: an account of our reasons, which I call
meaning-based, to avoid complicity in wrongful practices that doesn't turn on a causal solution to the problem.

Book reviews

  • Engel M. Jr. and Comstock, G. L., eds., The Moral Rights of Animals (Lexington Books, 2016), Essays in Philosophy 19(1) [link]

  • Glover J., Questions de vie ou de mort [Causing death and Saving Lives] (Labor et Fides, 2017), La Vie des Idées [FR] [EN]

  • Pelluchon C., Les nourritures (Seuil, 2015), Implications Philosophiques [link]

  • Boehm Ch., Moral Origins (Basic Books, 2012), Metapsychology Reviews Online [link]

  • Parfit D., On What Matters, 2 vol. (Oxford UP, 2011), Nonfiction [link]

  • Nussbaum M., Les émotions démocratiques [Not For Profit] (Flammarion, 2011), Implications Philosophiques [link]

  • Lestel D., L’animal est l’avenir de l’homme (Fayard, 2010), Raison Publique [link]

  • Wolff F., Notre humanité (Fayard, 2010), Nonfiction [link]